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It is commonly believed that information spreads between individuals like a pathogen, with each
exposure by an informed friend potentially resulting in a naive individual becoming infected. How-
ever, empirical studies of social media suggest that individual response to repeated exposure to
information is significantly more complex than the prediction of the pathogen model. As a proxy
for intervention experiments, we compare user responses to multiple exposures on two different social
media sites, Twitter and Digg. We show that the position of the exposing messages on the user-
interface strongly affects social contagion. Accounting for this visibility significantly simplifies the
dynamics of social contagion. The likelihood an individual will spread information increases mono-
tonically with exposure, while explicit feedback about how many friends have previously spread it
increases the likelihood of a response. We apply our model to real-time forecasting of user behavior.
People talk about ideas and information spreading be-
tween people like viruses, using phrases like “social con-
tagion,” “contagious ideas” and “viral content.” This
biological metaphor serves as a starting point for many
analyses of information spread [1, 15, 22, 24]. However,
recent works have observed that multiple exposures to
a piece of information suppress an individual’s response,
thus suggesting that social contagion is more complex
than originally thought [27, 31]. Our work clears the
confusion and shows that there are important and sur-
prising differences between the spread of information and
the spread of disease, stemming from human cognitive
limitations for discovering information. Once we account
for the information discovery process, social contagion is
actually quite simple and people’s responses can be ac-
curately predicted.
From a theoretical perspective, the simplest and most
widely studied model of social contagion is the indepen-
dent cascade model (ICM), which also serves as the basis
of the SIS and SIR models of biological epidemics [16].
The ICM assumes that each exposure of a healthy (naive)
person by an infected (informed) friend leads to an in-
dependent chance of information transmission. There-
fore, the probability that a healthy individual becomes
infected increases monotonically with the number of ex-
posures, potentially causing a global epidemic involving
a substantial fraction of the population [6, 29]. How-
ever, studies of information spread in social media have
identified social behaviors that qualitatively differ from
predictions of the ICM. For example, when measuring
how people respond to their friends’ use of certain memes
or recommendations for news articles, repeated exposure
initially increases infection probability, but eventually ex-
posure appears to be inhibitory [27, 31]. A number of
explanations have been offered for this aberration, in-
cluding complex contagion [8, 14, 32]. In complex con-
tagion, the probability to adopt a behavior, or an idea,
varies with the extent of exposure, suggesting that social
phenomena may drive respnse and interact non-trivially
with network structure [7, 13, 26]. Among other factors
thought to affect social contagion are the novelty [34]
or persistence [27] of information, and competition with
other information [33]. The role of cognitive constraints
in online social interactions has not been widely exam-
ined, although one study of Twitter demonstrated that
people limit themselves to approximately 150 conversa-
tion partners [12], a number similar to the bound on hu-
man social group size [10].
In this Letter, we present novel techniques, originating
from non-equilibrium statistical physics, to analyze user
behavior data from two online social networks, Digg and
Twitter. Our approach enables us to separate the factors
of social contagion that are attributable to the visibility
of information (i.e., how easily it can be discovered in the
user interface of each site) from the factors attributable
to social influence. We reveal that, after accounting for
these factors, contagion becomes quite simple: each ex-
posure increases the likelihood of a response, and social
signals about the number of friends who have previously
adopted the information (when such signals are provided
by the web site) further amplify the probability of a re-
sponse. This result implies that people are much more
susceptible to social media campaigns than previously
believed. Finally, we show that we are able to forecast
an individual’s behavior in real-time on both sites.
I. DATA SOURCES
To compare how visibility and social factors contribute
to contagion, we collected data from two social media
sites: Digg and Twitter. The microblogging service Twit-
ter allows registered users to broadcast short messages,
called tweets, to their followers. A message may contain
a URL to external web content. In addition to posting
a new message, a user can also retweet an existing mes-
sage, analogous to forwarding an email. Twitter users
create social links by following other users. Each link is
directed: we refer to the followed user as the friend, and
the following user as the follower. Upon visiting Twitter,
a user is presented with a stream containing tweets made
by friends, ordered as a first-in last-out queue, with the
2most recent tweet (or retweet) at the top of the queue.
Social news aggregator Digg leverages opinions of its
users to help people discover interesting news stories.
Users submit URLs to news stories and vote for, or digg,
stories submitted by others. Users can follow the activity
of others. The social user-interface on Digg shows a user
a stream of stories his or her friends recently submitted
or voted for. The stream is ordered chronologically by
time of earliest recommendation (submission or vote) by
a friend, with the most recent newly-recommended story
at the top. When a user votes for a story, the recommen-
dation is broadcast to a user’s followers. However, addi-
tional recommendations do not change the story’s rela-
tive position in the user’s default social stream. Instead,
a badge appears next to the story telling user how many
friends have recommended it. When the story receives
enough votes, Digg promotes it to the front page. How-
ever, before promotion, it can be found through friends’
recommendations or on the newly submitted stories list,
which at the time of data collection was receiving tens of
thousands of new submissions daily.
We used Twitter’s Gardenhose API to collect tweets
over a period of three weeks in the Fall of 2010. We
retained tweets that contained a URL in the body of
the message. We used Twitter’s search API to retrieve
all tweets containing those URLs, ensuring the complete
tweeting history of all URLs, giving us more than 3 mil-
lion tweets in total. We also collected the friend and
follower information for all tweeting users, resulting in
a social graph with almost 700K nodes and over 36M
edges. We filtered out URLs whose retweeting behav-
ior exhibits patterns associated with spam or automatic
activity [11], leaving us a data set containing 2K dis-
tinct URL’s retweeted a total of 213K times. We use
time stamps in tweet metadata combined with the fol-
lower graph to track when users are exposed to URLs
by a friend and when they retweet them. We define a
retweet to be anytime a user tweets a URL that had
previously appeared in her Twitter feed. After removing
spam URLs, we only consider events where users received
a particular URL less than 20 times, to further eliminate
likely spam URLs.
We used the Digg API to collect data about 3.5K sto-
ries promoted to the front page in June 2009 and the
times at which 140K distinct users voted for these sto-
ries. We also collected information about voters’ friends,
giving us a social graph with 280K users and 1.7M links.
For the present analysis, unless noted otherwise we con-
sider only the voting dynamics occurring before promo-
tion to the front page, so the primary means of informa-
tion propagation is through the friends interface. Both
datasets were divided into training and test sets to rule-
out over-fitting in determining the correct interpretation
of the data.
II. RESULTS
Using URLs as markers, we study the spread of infor-
mation through the follower graphs of Digg and Twitter.
A user may be exposed multiple times by friends to a
URL. The exposure response function gives the probabil-
ity of an infection as a function of the number of such ex-
posures. An exposure occurs when a message containing
the URL arrives in the user’s stream, even if the user does
not consciously see it. When aggregated over all users,
both Twitter and Digg exposure response functions sug-
gest complex contagion [27]: while initial exposures in-
crease infection probability, further exposures appear to
saturate (Twitter) or suppress (Digg) further infection
(Fig. 1). Aggregated exposure response obscures hetero-
geneous behavior, because it conflates the response of
users with different cognitive loads, i.e., different quan-
tities of information in their stream. A large volume of
incoming information, which scales with the number of
friends a user follows as n1.14f , reduces the user’s ability
to find any specific message [17, 19]. The likelihood a
user will find a message containing the URL, therefore,
has a normalization factor that depends on the number
of friends, denoted P(nf) [18].
To become infected, a user must first discover at least
one message containing the URL. The likelihood the user
will see a specific message depends on its position in the
user’s stream. We use the term ‘visibility’ to refer to
this quantity. A new message starts at the top of the
queue, where it is highly likely to be seen, because users
usually start browsing from the top of a page [5]. With
time, newer messages push it down the queue, where a
user is less likely to see it before he or she gets bored,
distracted, or leaves the site for any other reason [20, 23].
We measure a message’s dynamic visibility using the time
response function, T (∆t, nf ), the probability that a user
with nf friends retweets or votes at a time ∆t after the
exposure [18]. We plot T (∆t, nf ) for Twitter and Digg in
Fig. 2(a) and 2(b), respectively, demonstrating that the
visibility of a new message decays rapidly in time. Digg
stories were only followed until promotion, which occurs
at most 24 hours after appearing on Digg. The data are
smoothed using progressively wider smoothing windows,
as in [18].
A model describing user response to multiple expo-
sures must consider the visibility of each exposure. In
addition, a website’s use of any social signals — for exam-
ple, displaying the number of friends who recommended
the URL — may alter user response, given that they
have found the URL. The probability that a user with
nf friends will be infected after ne exposures is
P (t;ne, nf ) =
ne∑
n=1
F (n)Vn(t, {t1, . . . , tne};nf), (1)
where Vn() is the probability of finding n of the ne expo-
sures occurring at the times t1, . . . , tne , and F (n) is the
social enhancement factor accounting for the user observ-
3ing that ne of their fiends have recommended the story.
Note that this formalism averages out content-specific
factors and variable weights that a user may ascribe to
different friends.
The particular functional form of Vn depends on details
of the website user-interface. On Twitter, all messages
start at the top of the stream. By scanning the stream, a
user can discover each message independently, so any of
the exposures can result in an infection. This behavior
is well approximated by the probability of becoming in-
fected by at least one exposure (see Supplement), given
by
PTwitter(t;nf , ne) =P0F (ne)(1−
ne∏
i=1
1− P(nf )T (∆ti, nf )
+ vmin, (2)
where vmin is the effective minimum visibility of a mes-
sage in the Twitter interface, the proportionality P0 is
fitted by minimizing weighted mean absolute percent
(WMAP), as described in the Supplementary Methods,
and ne is the number of exposures to the URL at time t.
Underlying activity rates and cultural norms vary from
site to site, so the proportionality P0 can be interpreted
as a task-specific scale factor. The effective minimum vis-
ibility exists due to a user’s ability to discover the URL
outside the social media site or via other interfaces.
We calculate P(nf ) by measuring the average proba-
bility of retweeting the URL for users who were exposed
once and only once to it. The average is taken over all
users with nf friends, as described in [18, 19]. The time
response function T (∆ti, nf ) describes the visibility of a
message since exposure at ti. This is given by proba-
bility, shown in Fig. 2, that a user with nf friends will
retweet a time ∆ti after the exposure, given that retweet-
ing occurred. The time response function, T (∆t, nf )
is produced by calculating the probability that a user
retweets/votes at the indicated interval ∆t after a URL’s
arrival, given that the user votes on that URL.
The Digg user-interface differs from Twitter in that
messages are by default ordered by the time of their first
appearance in the user’s stream. Any additional votes do
not alter its position, but are reflected in a badge next to
the URL that shows the number of friends, ne, who voted
for the URL. The badge provides a social signal, which
may alter user response. Because of the user-interface,
Eq. (1) reduces to
PDigg(t;nf , ne) = F
′(ne) (P
′
0P
′(nf )T
′(∆t, nf ) + v
′
min) ,
(3)
where ∆t is the time elapsed from the first vote by a
friend, and the primes indicate Digg specific values for
each quantity. We empirically determined F ′(ne) using
a maximum likelihood estimate, described in the Sup-
plementary Methods. Social feedback in Digg results in
large amplification of the probability of infection, shown
in Fig. 3(c). This could have multiple origins, including
endorsement by friends [4], or from the increased visibil-
ity of the URL via alternative ways of discovering it on
Digg, such as sorting URLs by popularity.
To validate the proposed model of social contagion,
we forecast user activity and compare it to observed ac-
tivity. Specifically, we calculate the observed frequency
that a user with nf friends retweeted a URL in our Twit-
ter dataset or voted for one in the Digg dataset in the
subsequent 30 seconds. Then, using Eq. (2) or Eq. (3),
we calculate the theoretical probability that a user with
that many friends would act in those 30 seconds, given
the same exposures. Plotting the predicted versus ob-
served probabilities allows us to graphically assess the
accuracy of the contagion model. Unbiased forecasts
lie along the line of the graph. The proposed model
accurately forecasts response to multiple exposures on
Twitter (Fig. 4(b)) and Digg (Fig. 4(d)), indicated by
a WMAP error of 0.5% and 1.5%, respectively. Ignoring
social enhancement, and thereby utilizing a model akin to
an ICM, produces systematically biased results, shown in
Figs. 4(a) and 4(c). Hence, any ICM-based model, such
as a traditional SIR, could not achieve unbiased forecast-
ing without accounting for social enhancement. Simi-
larly, a model that does not account for visibility decay
could not account for variations in user-interface, evident
in the difference between Eqs. (2) and (3).
Rapid decay of visibility, combined with decreased sus-
ceptibility of highly connected users, explains why infor-
mation in social media fails to spread as widely as pre-
dicted by the generic ICM [31]. We can rule out novelty
decay, at least on Twitter, because after taking visibility
into account, infection probability does not depend on
the age of the information [18] We cannot evaluate nov-
elty decay for Digg, because we examine only the votes
URLs receive within 24 hours of submission (before it is
promoted to the front page), which is too short a time
period to see novelty decay. Although different types
of information may spread according to slightly differ-
ent patterns [35, 36] our analysis is content agnostic, so
the reported results are the population average, with the
caveat that we have removed most spam. Explicit so-
cial feedback can significantly magnify user response, al-
beit making it less useful for popularizing high-quality
content [28]. Unlike Digg, the Twitter user-interface of-
fered no explicit social feedback (beyond trending topics).
Users may remember seeing a friend’s recommendation of
the URL, a factor that could explain the slight social en-
hancement seen in Twitter response in Fig. 3(a). When
explicit social feedback is present, as in Digg, Fig. 3(d)
shows that users appear to weigh their actions based on
the fraction of friends endorsing a URL instead of con-
sidering the absolute number. This effect could explain
complex contagion, in which “network effects” appear to
play a significant role in the contagion process [7].
4III. CONCLUSIONS
The present results show that there are important and
surprising differences between the spread of information
and a disease that stem from human cognitive limita-
tions for processing information. In pathogenic conta-
gion, highly connected people amplify the spread of dis-
ease, but in social contagion they inhibit the spread. This
is because these people are so overloaded with other in-
formation their friends post, they are less likely to notice
and act on a particular piece of information, and they
require stronger social signal to act (Fig. 3(d)), on av-
erage. As the visibility of a message decays, users are
less likely to expend the effort required to find it. Be-
cause the volume of information scales with the number
of friends a user follows, visibility decays faster for users
with more friends, making highly connected users far less
susceptible to any single exposure than poorly connected
users [18, 19]. Users with many friends are less likely to
respond, and they dominate the high-exposure portion
of the average exposure response function (Fig. 1), giv-
ing the impression that more exposures may be counter-
productive. On the contrary, the present work suggests
that people are more susceptible to repeated exposure
than the population average suggests.
By comparing two different websites with very dif-
ferent user-interfaces, we have demonstrated that it is
possible to isolate the factors in social contagion due
to social feedback and the user-interface, without di-
rectly manipulating the underlying social network or
user-interface [3, 4, 7]. Moreover, the unbiased fidelity
of the proposed model suggests that once visibility of the
exposures is taken into account, social contagion oper-
ates as a simple contagion, i.e., with infection probability
increasing monotonically with the number of exposures,
which can be quantified by utilizing properly normalized
time response functions.
Our work highlights how cognitive constraints impact
information processing in everyday activities. While hu-
mans have developed large brains, partly to handle the
mental demands of social life [9, 30], cognitive constraints
imposed by our brain’s finite capacity to process infor-
mation affects social behavior, for example, by limiting
maximum group size [10]. Cognitive constraints also af-
fect how individuals utilize their dynamic information
streams in social media. Attentive acts, such as brows-
ing a website and reading tweets, require mental effort,
and since the brain’s capacity for mental effort is limited
by its energy requirements, so it attention [21]. This
will tend to reduce the likelihood of response under con-
ditions of high information load. Thus, social contagion
will be highly dependent on explicit social feedback and
the user-interface.
Regardless of the social synergy desired by the social
network, visibility of the URL appears to be an essential
factor in determining accuracy of activity forecasts. Be-
cause users only dedicate a limited amount of time and
effort interacting with any website, the site’s visibility
policy will largely determine the quality of the user ex-
perience with respect to information discovery and prop-
agation. Thus, because Digg does not refresh the position
of a URL after each recommendation, the social signals
it uses do not compensate for the loss of visibility the
URL suffers over time. Each website’s design choice can
broaden or narrow the user-base’s attention, but what-
ever information occupies a position of high visibility will
dominate social contagion originating from that site. Al-
though the current work provides techniques for real-time
forecasting of the average user behavior on a specific web-
site, understanding the emergence of globe-spanning viral
content will require accounting for the interaction of the
dynamic visibility and social synergy across a multitude
of websites and media outlets.
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6IV. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A. Methods
To calculate probabilities of response to multiple ex-
posures, the data was broken down into separate time
series, each corresponding to the arrival of specific URL-
containing tweets or votes into a single user’s stream. For
each series, at every one-second interval we calculate the
quantity we define as ‘visibility’ of the URL:
Vall(t, nf ) = 1−
∏
d
(1 − T (t− ti, nf )), or
Vfirst(t, nf ) = T (t− t0, nf ),
where nf is the number of friends of the user, T (∆t, nf ) is
the time response function for a user with nf friends. Vall
is proportional to the probability of finding any one of the
received messages at time t , while Vfirst is proportional
to the probability of finding only the first message.
We calculate P(nf ) by measuring the average proba-
bility of retweeting the URL for users who were exposed
once and only once to it. The average is taken over all
users with nf friends, as described in [18, 19]. The time
response function T (∆ti, nf ) describes the visibility of a
message since exposure at ti. This is given by probability,
shown in Fig. 2, that a user with nf friends will retweet
a time ∆ti after the exposure, given that retweeting oc-
curred.
The time response function, T (∆t, nf ) is produced by
calculating the probability that a user retweets/votes at
the indicated interval ∆t after a URL’s arrival, given that
the user votes on that URL. For Twitter data we calcu-
late the time response function only for those events in
which a user received the URL once and only once. For
Digg, this constraint is lifted, because there are too few
such events in the Digg data. The precise time response
function depends on nf , because users with many friends
receive new messages at a higher rate, causing the visi-
bility of any specific message to decay more quickly [18].
We lack sufficient data to precisely calculate the time
response function for each nf . Instead, we calculated
the time response function for users with nf = 1 − 2,
nf = 9− 11 , and nf = 90− 110, producing T1, T10, and
T100, respectively, following the procedure in [18]. To es-
timate the time response function for arbitrary nf , we
interpolated as follows:
w1 ≡ ((nf − 1)
2 + 10−6)−1
w10 ≡ ((nf − 10)
2 + 10−6)−1
w100 ≡ ((nf − 100)
2 + 10−6)−1 for Twitter, or
w100 ≡ (|nf − 100|+ 10
−6)−1 for Digg
T (∆t, nf ) =
w1T1(∆t) + w10T10(∆t) + w100T100(∆t)
w1 + w10 + w100
.
To produce the fits for vmin and P0, we plot the calcu-
lated probability versus the observed probability for an
event, i.e. forming a function O(p), where p is the calcu-
lated probability. We isolated the events corresponding
to a receiving a single message, leading to a subset of pre-
dictions denoted O1(p). We then minimize the weighted
mean absolute percent error (WMAP) [2],
〈|P0O1(p) + vmin − p| /p〉
by searching over P0 and vmin. For Digg, we have
P0 = 667, log(vmin) = −19. An analytical form for
P(nf ) was determined by fitting to minimize RMS er-
ror of the empirically determined P(nf ) [18], giving
Digg’s P ′(nf ) = A/((e
Bnf +C)(nf +D)(nf +E)), where
A = 7.6 · 10−3, B = −6.2 · 10−2, C = 1.7 · 10−3, D =
3.7, E = 17.8[25]. For Twitter we have P0 = 16.6 and
log(vmin) = −14, and we used P(nf ) = An
P
f /(nf + B),
where A = 0.3, P = 0.16, C = 0.55.
To calculate the social enhancement factors, we
carry out the MLE for F (ne) in the following man-
ner. We take as axiomatic the true probability of
a response given ne exposures is F (ne)P (ν), where
ν parameterizes the underlying visibility. Thus,
given N(ν) observed events for a specific ν, the
likelihood, ℓ, of observing Nr(ν) responses is de-
termined by the binomial distribution ℓ(ν, ne) =(
N(ν)
Nr(ν)
)
(F (ne)P (ν))
Nr(ν) (1− F (ne)P (ν))
N(ν)−Nr(ν) .
The total log-likelihood of observing the curve One(ν) is
thus
L(ne) =
∑
ν
log
(
N(ν)
Nr(ν)
)
+Nr(ν) (logF (ne) + logP (ν))
+ (N(ν)−Nr(ν)) log (1− F (ne)P (ν)) .
For each value of ne, we find the value of F (ne) that
maximizes L(ne). First, for ne = 1, we define F (1) = 1,
so we obtain the MLE for P (ν) using
∂
∂P (ν)
L(1) =
Nr(ν)
P (ν)
−
N(ν)−Nr(ν)
1− P (ν)
= 0,
giving P (ν) = Nr(ν)/N(ν). Then, for ne > 1, we are
left to find the likelihood maximizing F (ne) given P (ν),
leading to
∂
∂F (ne)
L(ne) =
∑
ν
Nr(ν)
F (ne)
− (N(ν)−Nr(ν))
P (ν)
1− F (ne)P (ν)
.
Numerically solving for ∂
∂F (ne)
L(ne) = 0 provides the
MLE for F (ne).
The minimum possible observed probability is
bounded by the number of observed events. In the fore-
casting predictions, the friend-cohort breakdown in Fig. 4
appears to deviate from the observed probabilities at very
high and low predicted probabilities. However, this is due
to the minimum probability floor rising beyond the pre-
dicted=observed line, because events with high visibility
and high social influence or very low visibility are less
common.
7B. Approximating Visibility Functions
Depending on the user-interface, the user may be ex-
posed to a URL from a variety of different messages. Un-
der general conditions, the probability of discovering a
URL will depend on the visibility of each of those mes-
sages. In addition, the user’s response may differ depend-
ing on how many times they actually observed the URL.
Thus, the probability of being infected by a URL will de-
pend on the probability of seeing the URL n times and an
enhancement factor, f(n;nf ), arising from the collective
effect of multiple exposures. The probability of acting at
time t is, therefore,
P (t, ne;nf ) =
ne∑
n=1
f(n;nf)Vn(t, {t1, . . . , tne};nf),
where Vn(t, {t1, . . . , tn};nf) is the probability of explic-
itly observing n of the ne URL’s that arrived at times
t1, . . . , tne . For Digg before promotion to the front page,
the URL is ordered by the time of its first recommenda-
tion to the user, so Vn(t) = δn,neP(nf )T (n, nf ), where
δn,ne is the Kronecker delta function. Thus, only one
term is relevant for Digg. Approximating f(ne;nf ) as
the social enhancement factor F (ne) gives the probabil-
ity of Digging a URL a user receives to be Eq. (3).
For Twitter, each tweet is displayed based on the
chronological order of its arrival, so there may be mul-
tiple tweets potentially containing the same URL in the
user’s stream. Each tweet decays in visibility according
to the time-response function, based on the time of its
arrival in the user’s stream. Thus, the probability of dis-
covering tweet i containing the URL arriving at time ti
is P(nf )T (t− ti, nf). For brevity, we will abbreviate this
quantity as τi ≡ P(nf )T (t − ti, nf ). The probability of
seeing a URL only once is
V1(t) =
ne∑
i
ne∏
j 6=i
τi(1 − τj).
Similarly, the probability of seeing exactly two out of ne
URL’s is
V2(t) =
ne−1∑
i
ne∑
j>i
ne∏
j 6=i
ne∏
k 6=i,j
τiτj(1− τk).
As ne grows, the number of combinations required to
enumerate each Vn grows rapidly with ne. Vn will have
ne!/n!(ne − n)! terms. Although one could calculate all
Vn explicitly every time-step for every user and URL,
this is currently computationally prohibitive. We pro-
pose an approximate form for PTwitter , Eq. (2), justified
as follows.
Although each Vn for Twitter may have many terms, it
can be represented succinctly using a generation function,
Vn = Cne
1
n!
∂n
∂yn
ne∏
i=1
(
1 +
τi
1− τi
y
)∣∣∣∣
y=0
,
where Cne ≡
∏ne
i=1(1−τi) is the probability of not seeing
any of the ne tweets. Using this form, the exact expres-
sion for PTwitter is
Pexact = Cne
ne∑
n=1
f(n;nf)
n!
∂n
∂yn
ne∏
i=1
(
1 +
τi
1− τi
y
) ∣∣∣∣
y=0
.
We wish to know how well Pexact can be approximated
if we take f(n;nf) = Ftw(ne), i.e. determining the prob-
ability of seeing any URL, with a social enhancement
factor. Using generating functions, this approximation is
expressed as
P ∗ =CneFtw(ne)
ne∑
n=1
1
n!
∂n
∂yn
ne∏
i=1
(
1 +
τi
1− τi
y
) ∣∣∣∣
y=0
=CneFtw(ne)
(
e
∂
∂y − 1
) ne∏
i=1
(
1 +
τi
1− τi
y
)∣∣∣∣
y=0
,
where e
∂
∂y =
∑
n=0
1
n!
∂n
∂yn
. One may show that
ea
∂
∂y f(y) = f(y + a) by left-multiplying both sides of
this identity by the inverse operator e−a
∂
∂y . Using this
identity gives
P ∗ =CneFtw(ne)
(
ne∏
i=1
(1 +
τi
1− τi
)− 1
)
=Ftw(ne)
(
1−
ne∏
i=1
(1− P(nf )T (∆ti, nf ))
)
,
where we have expanded all of the definitions in the last
line above. To find the best choice for Ftw(ne) to deter-
mine its suitability as an approximation, we define the
ratio
F ∗(ne, t) ≡
Pexact
P ∗/Ftw(ne)
=
SˆfG(y)(
e
∂
∂y − 1
)
G(y)
∣∣∣∣
y=0
,
where Sˆf ≡
∑ne
n=1
f(n;nf )
n!
∂n
∂yn
and G(y) ≡∏ne
i=1
(
1 + τi1−τi y
)
. That is, F ∗(ne, t) is simply the
time-dependent ratio of the exact expression for seeing
one of ne tweets to the approximated form (without
Ftw(ne)). If this quantity varies very little with time,
then taking F ∗(ne, t) ∼ Ftw(ne) will give a good
approximation.
Because of the nature of the Digg interface, as stated
above, we can directly observe plausible forms for the
f(n;nf) enhancements. We observe that Digg enhance-
ments are generally linear, and we may surmise an ap-
proximate form for the Twitter enhancements to be
f(n;nf) ≈ αn + β. This is not to hypothesize a true
form of f(n) for Twitter but to merely provide a plau-
sible function form to test the accuracy of the proposed
8approximation. This gives
Sˆf =α
ne∑
n=1
n
n!
∂n
∂yn
+ β
(
e
∂
∂y − 1
)
=α
∂
∂y
e
∂
∂y + β
(
e
∂
∂y − 1
)
.
Replacing the first sum is possible because derivative-
orders greater than ne evaluate to 0. Returning to the
expression for F ∗(ne, t), we have
F ∗(ne, t) =
αG′(1) + β(G(1) − 1)
G(1)− 1
= α
∑n3
i=1 τi
1−
∏ne
i=1(1− τi)
+ β.
Because each τ is proportional to the time-response func-
tion, F ∗tw varies with time. Because the probabilities of
conducting any action on Twitter at any instant are low,
τ ≪ 1. Consider the two extreme, yet plausible, sce-
narios: 1) The user receives ne messages simultaneously
all with maximum visibility or 2) The user receives ne
messages which have decayed to extremely low visibility,
so τ → vmin. For case 1, the maximum visibility cor-
responds to P(nf )T (∼ 0, nf), which is very small, i.e.,
< 10−3 [18]. For case 2, the minimum visibility is vmin,
so for either limit we have
F ∗ = αneτ0/ (1− (1− τ0)
ne) + β ≈ α+ β +
α
2
(ne − 1)τ0.
In case 1, τ0 = τmax, and in case 2, τ0 = vmin. Thus, in
either limit, F ∗ will tend to have a characteristic value of
α+β, varying weakly with time, confirming the argument
that the full Pexact can be approximated by P
∗.
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FIG. 1. The exposure response function for Digg and Twitter averaged over all users. In Digg, a vote is a digg by a friend.
In Twitter a vote is a received tweet containing the URL. This averaging gives the appearance of reduced susceptibility to
repeated exposure.
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FIG. 2. The time response function, the probability density of voting for a URL at a given time, drops off rapidly. Digg stories
were only followed until promotion, which occurs at most 24 hours after appearing on Digg. The data are smoothed using
progressively wider smoothing windows.
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FIG. 3. The social enhancement factors for Twitter and Digg. (A,C) Averaged over all users, (B,D) Calculated for sub-
populations based on the number for friends, nf . The decay in the social enhancement factor for Twitter can be attributed to
residual spam in the dataset.
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FIG. 4. The social enhancement factors for Twitter and Digg. (A,C) Averaged over all users, (B,D) Calculated for sub-
populations based on the number for friends, nf . The decay in the social enhancement factor for Twitter can be attributed to
residual spam in the dataset.
